Educational research: ‘games of truth’ and the ethics of subjectivity

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Abstract
In an interview a year before his death, Foucault confessed that his real quarry was not an investigation of power but rather the history of the ways in which human beings are constituted as subjects; a process that involved power relations as an integral aspect of the production of discourses involving truths. His work dealt with three modes of objectification in our culture that transform human beings into subjects: modes of inquiry which try to give themselves the status of the sciences; the objectivisation of the subject in ‘dividing practices’; and the way a human being turns him or herself into a subject. For Foucault, ‘games of truth’ are sets of procedures that lead to certain results which, on the basis of the principles and rules of procedures, may be considered valid or invalid. And he asks, ‘How did it come about that all of Western culture began to revolve around this obligation of truth?’ In this paper, I begin by examining Foucault’s approach to truth-telling (parrhesia) in relation to the changing practice of educational research. Foucault’s notion of ‘games of truth’ is applied to educational research, and used to investigate the politics of knowledge and the ethics of the researcher’s identity.


1. Introduction: Foucault and educational research
Foucault’s influence on educational research is undeniable and rapidly growing, both in terms of his thought, described under the broader label of ‘poststructuralist’ (Peters & Wain 2002), and because he was a unique philosopher who transcended his own time (Peters 2000). In particular, his genealogies of the human subject,
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: ‘GAMES OF TRUTH’ AND THE ETHICS OF SUBJECTIVITY

histories of subjectivities, and his analysis of how power relations and discourses shape processes of ethical self-constitution have proved powerful approaches to providing critical histories of childhood, students and schools as well as helping researchers to problematise educational concepts, categories and institutions.

Foucault’s impact on educational research is still in the process of development and assessment (see Peters 2003a; Peters & Burbules 2004), but it is clear that his influence, nearly 20 years after his death, is extensive, and his approach provides researchers in education with a critical perspective based on an original theory of power that owes nothing to Liberal or Marxist thought. Foucault also provides a set of historical methodologies (archaeology and genealogy), and a refinement of analytical tools that enable social and spatial epistemologies of discursive and institutional regimes.

Yet, given these developments, I do not think that the use and development of Foucault’s work is yet well enough established in educational research to begin to talk about clear differences or orientations in English-speaking countries in the way that we might distinguish among various national or distinctive readings of Foucault in sociology, history or political studies.

For instance, we can talk of the French Foucaultians, comprised of Foucault’s students, including Jacques Donzelot and François Ewald. Or, we might talk of the Anglo-Australasian governmentality group based around the journal Economy and Society established by Nikolas Rose, which includes Barry Hindess, Vikki Bell, Mitchell Dean, Ian Hunter, Pat O’Malley and Barbara Cruikshank, among others. We might also mention specifically Foucaultian historians such as Hayden White and Mark Poster (although these do not constitute a group); or Foucaultian sociologists such as Barry Smart, Alan Hunt and Clare O’Farrell. In this regard, it is important to mention the US, French or Australian feminists (whose complexity defy easy classification, but see Lois McNay, for example).

Even so, it is important to note that a group of American scholars organised a number of pre-conference sessions at the American Educational Research Association (AERA) and established in the mid-1990s a Foucault SIG ‘Dedicated to the historical and philosophical studies of education that engage the writings of Michel Foucault’. In the educational literature – that published in English, at least – we can begin to track some of the lines of Foucaultian research in education.

In Britain during the mid-1980s, Valerie Walkerdine’s (1984, 1988) critical psychology approach to child development strongly influenced British educational circles. Thereafter, the use of Foucault has been dominated by the ethno-sociological orientation of Stephen Ball (1990, 1994) – although David Hoskin’s (1979) work has also been influential, as has that of Norman Fairclough (2000), whose discourse analysis based on Foucault has been applied to understandings of educational policy. More recently, Foucault has figured prominently in a special issue of the Journal of Education Policy dedicated to poststructuralism and educational research (Peters & Humes 2003).

New Zealanders have approached Foucault in diverse ways: Mark Olssen’s (1999, 2003) materialist interpretation of Foucault views him in close proximity to Gramsci; Tina Besley (2002, 2003) has put Foucault to work in understanding the significance of power relations in school counselling and, more broadly, in the construction of the self and of youth cultures; and Sue Middleton (1998), as a feminist, has critically appropriated his work on sexuality. I have sought to understand Foucault within the wider context of ‘poststructuralism’, focusing on themes of governance, subjectivity and ethics in relation to education policy (Peters 1988, 1996, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2003).

I have described Foucault’s many faces of educational research in terms of eight overlapping directions, which are not exhaustive of the educational research utilising Foucault but appear to me among the most significant currents (Peters 2003).

The many-sided Foucault in Anglo-American educational research

Figure 1

Foucault as naturalised Kantian: JD Marshall

Foucault as critical ethno-sociologist: Stephen Ball

Foucault as Nietzschean genealogist: Tina Besley

Foucault as historian of systems of thought: Bernadette Baker

Foucault as historical materialist (and democrat): Mark Olssen

Foucault as social epistemologist: Tom Popkewitz & Marie Brennan

Foucault as crypto-feminist: Sue Middleton

Foucault as poststructuralist: Michael A Peters

These eight directions in Foucaultian educational research are distinguished in terms of book contributions rather than papers. These are, of course, only what I take to be the major or most interesting directions, and I confess that the selection is biased in terms of my country of origin and own theoretical position. There are
many more scholars writing on education in the English-speaking world – for example, those who have contributed to Foucault SIGs at AERA over the years and those contributing to various educational and Foucault conferences and journals.\footnote{4}

Foucault studies in education provide tools for analysis that have inspired historical, sociological and philosophical approaches covering a bewildering array of topics: genealogies of pupils, students, teachers and counsellors; the social constructions of children, adolescence and youth; social epistemologies of the school in its changing institutional form, and studies of the emergence of the disciplines; and philosophical studies of educational concepts that developed with European humanism – especially in the Enlightenment and specifically Kantian formations focusing on the key concepts of ‘man’, ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’, ‘punishment’, ‘government’ and ‘authority’.

In all cases, the Foucaultian archive provides an approach to problematising concepts and practices that seemed resistant to further analysis before Foucault. These concepts and practices seemed institutionalised, ossified and destined to endless repetition in academic understandings and interpretations. After Foucault, it is as though we must revisit most of the important questions to do with power, knowledge, subjectivity and freedom in education.

My interests in Foucault have had two main directions: social and educational policy, on the one hand; and a more strictly philosophical approach to the subject or the self, on the other. In relation to the first direction, I have focused on Foucault’s understanding of space and its significance in understanding educational postmodernity (Peters 1996, 2003b) and applications of the notion of governmentality to: the neoliberal paradigm of educational policy (Peters 2001a); managerialism and self-governance in education (Peters et al 2000); and to entrepreneurial culture and the entrepreneurial self (Peters 2001b). I have also sought to indicate how Foucault, as part of the wider poststructuralist movement, might be of use to educational researchers (Peters 1999; Peters & Humes 2003; Peters & Burbules 2004).

In relation to the second direction, I have attempted to locate Foucault in the wider philosophical context of the philosophy of the subject (Peters 2000a), especially with respect to ‘writing the self’ (Peters 2000b) and in relation to Wittgenstein (Peters & Marshall 1999). For me, this connection between Foucault’s genealogies of the subject and governmentality provide the most fertile land to be tilled: truth-telling as an educational practice of the self (Peters 2003b), on the one hand; and what I call the ‘new prudentialism in education’, focusing on a notion of ‘actuarial rationality’ in the constitution of the entrepreneurial self, on the other (Peters 2003c).

I begin this paper by examining Foucault’s approach to truth-telling (parrhesia) in relation to the changing practice of educational research. I then apply Foucault’s notion of ‘games of truth’ to educational research, using it to investigate the politics of knowledge and the ethics of the researcher’s identity.
2. Foucault, games of truth and educational research

In the early 1980s, Denis Huisman asked François Ewald to reedit the entry on Foucault for a new edition of the *Dictionnaire des philosophes*. As the translator, Robert Hurley remarks in a footnote to the text ‘Foucault’: ‘The text submitted to Huisman was written almost entirely by Foucault himself, and signed anonymously ‘Maurice Florence’’ (p 458). Foucault begins that text with the following words: ‘To the extent that Foucault fits into the philosophical tradition, it is the critical tradition of Kant, and his project could be called A Critical History of Thought’ (Foucault 1998d, p 459). Later, he defines a critical history of thought as:

an analysis of the conditions under which certain relations of subject to object are formed or modified, insofar as those relations constitute a possible knowledge [savoir] … In short, it is a matter of determining its mode of ‘subjectivation’ … and objectivation … What are the processes of subjectivation and objectivation that make it possible for the subject qua subject to become an object of knowledge [connaissance], as a subject? (Foucault 1998d, pp 450–60)

He describes undertaking the constitution of the subject as an object of knowledge within certain scientific discourses or truth games we call the ‘human sciences’ (both empirical and normative), and as an object for himself: the history of subjectivity insofar as it involves ‘the way the subject experiences himself in a game of truth where it relates to himself’ (p 461), such as in the history of sexuality.

Foucault has given this kind of self-description elsewhere. In an interview a year before his death, Foucault (1983) confessed to Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus that his real quarry was not an investigation of power but rather the history of the ways in which human beings are constituted as subjects; a process that involved power relations as an integral aspect of the production of discourses involving truths.

My objective … has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects. My work has dealt with three modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects … The first is the modes of inquiry which try to give themselves the status of the sciences … In the second part of my work, I have studied the objectivizing of the subject in what I shall call ‘dividing practices’ … Finally, I have sought to study – it is my current work – the way a human being turns him- or herself into a subject. For example, I have chosen the domain of sexuality … Thus it is not power, but the subject that is the general theme of my research. (Foucault, 1982b: 209)

The history of the human subject for Foucault was intimately tied to the development of the human sciences in relation to knowledge and truth. In his early work, Foucault treated truth as a product of the regimentation of statements within discourses that had progressed or were in the process of progressing to the stage of a scientific discipline. In this conception, the subject, historicised in relation to social practices, is effectively denied freedom or effective agency. This early conception can be contrasted with his later notion of the subject, where he views freedom and truth-telling as essential aspects of its constitution (as in the concept of ‘governmentality’), and in his studies of the history of sexuality. For the early Foucault:
‘Truth’ is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. (Foucault 1980, p 133)

Foucault’s shift from ‘regimes of truth’ to ‘games of truth’ reflects a change in thinking concerning the agency of the subject and also his notion of truth. Foucault says in an interview with Gauthier:

I have tried to discover how the human subject entered into games of truth, whether they be games of truths which take on the form of science or which refer to a scientific model, or games of truth like those that can be found in institutions or practices of control. (Gauthier 1988, p 3)

And Foucault elaborates the concept of ‘game’ in the following way:

... when I say ‘game’ I mean an ensemble of rules for the production of truth ... It is an ensemble of procedures which lead to a certain result, which can be considered in function of its principles and its rules of procedure as valid or not, as winner or loser. (Gauthier 1988, p 15)

In a little-known paper delivered to a Japanese audience in 1978, Foucault took up the concept of game in relation to analytic philosophy (and probably Wittgenstein’s influential notion of ‘language-games’, although his name is not mentioned) to criticise its employment without an accompanying notion of power. Arnold Davidson (1997a, p 3) mentions a lecture ‘La Philosophie analytique de la politique’ in which Foucault (1978) makes an explicit reference to Anglo-American analytic philosophy:

For Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy it is a question of making a critical analysis of thought on the basis of the way in which one says things. I think one could imagine, in the same way, a philosophy that would have as its task to analyse what happens every day in relations of power. A philosophy, accordingly, that would bear rather on relations of power than on language games, a philosophy that would bear on all these relations that traverse the social body rather than on the effects of language that traverse and underlie thought. (cited in Davidson 1997a, p 3)

Language in Foucault’s conception ‘never deceives or reveals’ – rather, ‘Language, it is played. The importance, therefore, of the notion of game’. Further on, he makes the comparison: ‘Relations of power, also, they are played; it is these games of power that one must study in terms of tactics and strategy, in terms of order and of chance, in terms of stakes and objective’. (cited in Davidson 1997a, p 4)

As Foucault tried to indicate, discourse considered as speaking – as the employment of words – could be studied as strategies within genuine historical contexts, focusing upon the history of judicial practices, for example, or

even the discourse of truth, as rhetorical procedures, as ways of conquering, of producing events, of producing decisions, of producing battles, of producing victories. In order to “rhetorize” philosophy. (cited in Davidson 1997a, p 5)
Thus, ‘Games of truth’ signifies a changed sense of agency on the part of Foucault, who, investigating practices of self, becomes interested in questions of the ethical self-constitution of the subject and self-mastery, especially in his analysis of classical texts. Thus,

Unlike Habermas who postulates an ideal speech situation wherein games of truth would have the best chance of success, Foucault is a realist … Instead of an absolutely free discourse community, the best one can attain is a community in which one commands the requisite rules of procedure, as well as the “ethics, the ethos, the practice of self, which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination”. (Gauthier, 1988)

Paul Veyne (1997, p. 226) commented after Foucault’s death that, in his very first lecture at the Collège de France,

Foucault contrasted an ‘analytic philosophy of truth in general’ with his own preference ‘for critical thought that would take the form of an ontology of ourselves, of an ontology of the present’; he went so far, that day, as to relate his own work to ‘the form of reflection that extends from Hegel to the Frankfurt School via Nietzsche and Max Weber’.

Veyne warns us not to take that circumstantial analogy too far and, correctly in my view, puts us on a course that connects Foucault strongly to Nietzsche and Heidegger.

Foucault’s preference for a form of critical thought related to ‘truth games’, rather than an analytic philosophy of truth, stems from our classical Greek heritage, where the two – the analytic and the critical – emerged side by side. It is clear that Foucault, at least toward the end of his life, neither denied the classical ideal of truth as correspondence to an independently existing world, nor the ‘analytics of truth’. Foucault’s innovation was to historicise ‘truth’: first materially, in discourse as ‘regimes of truth’; and second, in practices as ‘games of truth’.

In a brilliant series of lectures entitled ‘Discourse and truth: the problematization of parrhesia’, given at Berkeley during October-November in 1983 and later published in English as Fearless speech (2001), Foucault outlines the meanings and the evolution of the classical Greek word ‘parrhesia’ and its cognates as they enter into and exemplify the changing practices of truth-telling in Greek society. In particular, Foucault investigates ‘the use of parrhesia in specific types of human relationships’ and ‘the procedures and techniques employed in such relationships’ (34/66). The importance of education and its relations to ‘care of the self’, public life and the crisis of democratic institutions are central to his analysis (see Peters 2003).

With Foucault we can distinguish at least two major models for understanding educational research. First, along with the early Foucault, we might hypothesise that educational research is a set of practices that are strongly influenced by more general epistemic cultural formations and codes, which shape the conditions of possibility for educational knowledge and determine the ‘rules of formation’ for discursive rationalities that operate beneath the level of the
researcher’s subjective awareness. Foucault calls these rules the *historical a priori* that operate as a ‘positive unconscious’ and constitute a whole epistemological field, or *episteme*.

The rules of discursive formation are not the invention of the researcher, but the *historical a priori* of a dynamic research community. We can expand this epistemological insight to talk of different and competing kinds of educational research and their different epistemological foundations (see e.g. Pring 2000). However, a Foucaultian account, even an archaeological one, would need to be a critical history of emerging systems of research practices within which researchers found themselves socially embedded. On this ‘structuralist’ or archaeological model of education, as one of the ‘sciences of man’, the researcher and the researched are located within the modern episteme based on the discourses of ‘Man’. The researcher and the researched are constituted beings; effects of discourse and regimes of truth.

In his later work, Foucault shifts from ‘regimes of truth’ to ‘games of truth’. Accordingly, the emphasis falls on how the human subject constitutes itself by strategically entering into such games and playing them to best advantage. Forms of educational research historically embedded within its various institutional contexts (research associations, conferences, journals, training regimes) thus constitute ‘games of truth’, where researchers constitute themselves and constitute the researched. The genealogical model makes room for human agency in the processes of subject constitution, attending to the local and ‘subjugated knowledges’ marginalised by positivistic sciences and Marxism. In this context, genealogies are ‘anti-sciences’ because they contest ‘the [coercive] effects of the centralising powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of an organised scientific discourse’ (Foucault 1980a, p 84). As Best (1994, p 36) remarks:

> Genealogy therefore seeks to vindicate local, disordered, and fragmentary forms of discourse and struggle to battle the operations of power within modern scientific discourses that attempt to assimilate or disqualify local knowledges.

In terms of the subjectivity of the educational researcher, we can perhaps best highlight the Foucaultian notion of ‘practices of the self’ by briefly examining qualitative research and the way in which the now traditional concept of ‘participant observer’ already tacitly begins the process of ‘unbracketing’ the subjectivity of the researcher – that is, challenging the objectivist ideology associated with bracketing one’s own beliefs, assumptions, tastes and preferences – in order to acknowledge how deeply they enter into knowledge constructions and power relations.

Foucault also provides us with the means to begin to question the relationship between researcher as author and text: between *doing* research and *reporting* on it. Of the diverse modes of reporting, none has sole purchase on the truth. Qualitative educational research, which is based on the researcher’s ‘understanding’ rather than on the constructed dialogue that takes place among participants – albeit with different roles and responsibilities – can no longer be sustained. In Foucault’s late work, we find a greater emphasis on the self-awareness of the researcher, on the identity of the researcher and on the ethics of self-constitution, which challenges and
brings a new focus to the researcher/subject relation and its discursive and methodological representations.

**Endnotes**

1 This essay draws on Peters (2003a, 2003c).

2 Ian Hunter’s book on reschooling is particularly worthy of mention in relation to this group.

3 Useful websites with proposals are available, at least for the AERA 2001 session. See the roundtables ‘Foucault and education: how do we know what we know?’ (chaired by Katharina Heyning with participation by Andrea Allard, Colin Green, Ruth Gustafson, Michael Ferrari and Rosa Lynn Pinkius, Stephen Thorpe, Cathy Toll, Kevin Vinson and Huey-li Li); and ‘Tinkering with Foucault’s tool-kit Down Under’ (chaired by Stephen Ball, with participation by Elizabeth McKinley, Mary Hill, Nesta Devine, Michael Peters, James Marshall and Sue Middleton).


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EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: ‘GAMES OF TRUTH’ AND THE ETHICS OF
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