Education, Enterprise Culture and the Entrepreneurial Self: A Foucauldian Perspective

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Abstract

The notion of ‘enterprise culture’ emerged in the United Kingdom as a central motif in political thought under Margaret Thatcher’s administration. The notion represented a profound shift away from the Keynesian welfare state to a deliberate attempt at cultural restructuring and engineering based upon the neo-liberal model of the entrepreneurial self - a shift characterised as a moving from a ‘culture of dependency’ to one of ‘self-reliance’. In education this shift took the form of the ‘enterprise education’ and the ‘enterprise curriculum’. This paper, utilising the perspective of Michel Foucault, analyses the ‘generalization of an ‘enterprise form’ to all forms of conduct’ (Burchell) and the way in which the promotion of an enterprise culture has become a style of government characteristic of both neo-liberalism and Third Way politics.

1. Introduction

This paper begins by focusing on the theme of the ‘responsibilising of the self’ as one of the distinctive means of neo-liberal governance of welfare and education. This theme is referred to as the development of the ‘entrepreneurial self’ and the paper examines this form of governance more fully through the rise of enterprise culture and enterprise education during the Thatcher years. It also suggests that this form of neo-liberal thinking underlies New Labour policies and Third Way politics. Finally, the paper provides a brief introduction to Foucault’s linking of the concepts of power, subjectivity and truth.
2. Neo-liberal Governance of Welfare and Education: Responsibilising the Self

The prevalence of the doctrine of the self-limiting state in many Western states, including the United Kingdom, has manifested itself in terms of neo-liberal welfare and education policies through an intensification of moral regulation rather than through an overall reduction of levels of welfare and education spending in real terms. During the 1980s the United Kingdom and other English-speaking countries saw the reduction of the state’s trading activities enacted through privatisation programs and the ‘downsizing’ of the public sector. This neo-liberal limiting of the State’s role decreased its power to mediate in the market to achieve the traditional welfare goal of full employment or of equality of opportunity in education.

Precisely at the point when neo-liberals were attempting conceptually to remoralise the link between welfare and employment and to ‘responsibilise’ individuals for investing in their own education, neo-liberal governments began to dismantle arrangements for State arbitration in the labour market, substituting individualised employment contracts, and exposing workers to the vagaries of the market. This policy move must be mapped against the growth of a recalcitrant and permanent underclass, of those who are structurally disadvantaged in terms of access to an increasingly specialised and highly segmented labour market. Intergenerational unemployment now seems an entrenched feature of most western states, with both a feminisation and a casualisation of the labour force and, often, high rates of youth unemployment, especially in depressed urban areas. Many commentators have discussed the potential de-skilling effects of the new information technologies and the redundancy of the unskilled, the semi-skilled, and manual labourers in face of greater computerisation and automation of both blue-collar work and service industries.

At the same time, there has been a cumulative shift in the tax burden away from corporations toward individual wage earners. Indirect forms of taxation (such as a goods and services tax) and the flat tax structure introduced by some OECD countries have ended up favouring corporations and high-income groups at the expense of low- to middle-income groups. The shift to indirect forms, particularly consumer taxes, is seen by policymakers as a way to retain revenue levels in face of an ageing population and labour force. This move has both politicised and encouraged political support among different constituencies, notably among middle-income earners, for policies designed to reduce levels of income tax - in fact, more broadly, for viewing a high income-tax level as undue state interference - in exchange for a privatised welfare system in which individuals, through user charges, vouchers, and forms of personal insurance, are forced to take care of themselves.

The state has only been able to begin the process of writing itself out of its traditional responsibilities concerning the welfare state through twin strategies of a greater individualisation of society and the responsibilisation of individuals and families. Both are often simultaneously achieved through a greater contractualisation of society, and particularly by contracting-out state services.
A genealogy of the entrepreneurial self reveals that it is the relationship, promoted by neo-liberalism, that one establishes to oneself through forms of personal investment (for example, user charges, student loans) and insurance that becomes the central ethical component of a new individualised and privatised consumer welfare economy. In this novel form of governance, responsibilised individuals are called upon to apply certain management, economic, and actuarial techniques to themselves as subjects of a newly privatised welfare regime.

In this context Burchell’s (1996, p 275) remark made in the context of a Foucauldian analysis of neo-liberalism that an ‘enterprise form’ is generalized to all forms of conduct and constitutes the distinguishing mark of the style of government, could not be more apt. At one and the same time enterprise culture provides the means for analysis and the prescription for change: education and training are key sectors in promoting national economic competitive advantage and future national prosperity. They are seen increasingly as the passport for welfare recipients to make the transition from dependent, passive welfare consumer to an entrepreneurial self.

In the past, so the neo-liberal argument goes, too much emphasis has been placed on social and cultural objectives and insufficient emphasis has been placed on economic goals in education systems. Henceforth, the prescription is for greater investment in education and training as a basis for future economic growth. Such investment in human skills is underwritten by theories of human capital development and human resources management. The major difference from previous welfare state regimes is that education, increasingly at all levels but more so at the level of tertiary education, is no longer driven by public investment but, rather, by private investment decisions. The uptake of education and training grants by able-bodied welfare recipients, especially women who are single parents, now becomes mandatory after a given period within countries where neo-liberal policies have been adopted, in what some see as a shift from a welfare state to a Schumpetarian workfare state.

The rigidity of the distinction between the private and the public has broken down: commercial and private enterprises exist within or in partnership with many ‘public’ education institutions. Human capital theory is rejuvenated in a privatised rather than statist or public form. The neo-liberal state has worked to make individual choice in the tertiary education market the overriding operative principle. Its aim has been to increase diversity - a prerequisite for choice - by abolishing the differences in the missions of the various institutions comprising the tertiary sector and to move to a fully consumer-driven system in which state funding is distributed to individual students by way of entitlements or vouchers rather than to the institutions or ‘providers’ themselves.

Under neo-liberalism, questions of national economic survival and competition in the world economy have come increasingly to be seen as questions of cultural reconstruction. The task of reconstructing culture in terms of enterprise has involved remodelling public institutions along commercial lines as corporations and has encouraged the acquisition and use of so-called entrepreneurial qualities. Thus,
and in accordance with this new discourse, both the welfare state and education systems have been criticised for leading to a ‘culture of dependency.’

It is against this general background that neo-liberal states have abandoned the traditional goals of the universalist welfare state of equality and participation based on social rights in favour of a reduced conception of a ‘modest safety net’ based on targeting social assistance and institutionalising user charges for social services. In addition, in some OECD countries there have been substantial cuts in welfare benefits, a tightening of eligibility criteria, the introduction of means testing, and a shift toward an increase in policing and surveillance by the state through the development of new information systems to reduce benefit fraud.

This process has been referred to as the emergence of a ‘shadow’ state: the privatisation of welfare through contestability of funding and the contracting out of welfare provision to the non-governmental informal sector comprised of church-based groups, charity organisations, private foundations, and trusts which, increasingly, minister to the ‘poor’ and the ‘disadvantaged’ according to set criteria and performance targets.

Above all, the theme of ‘responsibilising the self,’ a process at once economic and moral, is concomitant with a new tendency to ‘invest’ in the self at crucial points in the life cycle and symbolises the shift in the regime and governance of education and welfare under neo-liberalism. Risk and responsibility have been thematized in new ways. There has been a shift from a disciplinary technology of power, first, to welfarism - to programs of social security as governmentalised risk-management and to new forms of actuarial or insurance-based rationalities - and, second, to new forms of prudentialism (a privatised actuarialism) where risk management is forced back onto individuals and satisfied through the market. O’Malley (1996, p 200) comments ‘Within such prudential strategies, then calculative self-interest is articulated with actuarialism to generate risk management as an everyday practice of the self’. The duty to the self - its simultaneous responsibilisation as a moral agent and its construction as a calculative rational choice actor - becomes the basis for a series of investment decisions concerning one’s health, education, security, employability, and retirement.

The responsibilisation of the self and its associated new prudential strategies go hand in hand with two related developments: a substitution of ‘community’ for ‘society’ and the invention of new strategies for government through information. The first development is significant because it implicitly recognises a theoretical weakness in the strict neo-liberal model of social policy based upon the market alone. Although they do not want to reinvent society (as government has been ‘reinvented’), neo-liberals want to substitute some notion of civil society for the welfare state under the metaphor of community, where civil society means an association of free individuals based on self-rule.

The second line of development issues from the new opportunities for state surveillance and control that accompany the growth of information and communications technologies. In one sense, this can be seen as ‘government without
enclosures’ or ‘government within an open system’ (see Deleuze, 1995), which promotes more intensified visibility of both private and public spaces than ever before. Such unprecedented high levels of visibility are established through the new security and policing uses to which the video camera has been put in streets, malls, security systems within buildings, and the like and the advent of computerised citizen data, in the forms of ‘information sharing’ across separate government departments and the development of so-called smart card technology for specific purposes (for example, welfare recipients) or for more general ‘governmental’ purposes (for example, community cards). Information sharing and the application of new smart card technology have been applied to welfare ‘problems’ of benefit fraud and state calculation of welfare benefits and entitlements.

This movement toward greater control under the theme of responsibilisation of self is also seen in a new customised relation (a niche-market welfare) promoted between welfare officers who handle case loads and recipients. This involves risk-based targeting of services and the shift from an emphasis on a relationship based on professional authority (therapist, counsellor etc.), to an emphasis on self-empowerment and self-help based on training, education, and the development of ‘personal skills.’ Increasingly, government strategies signal a shift in orientation from welfare to well-being through the promotion of self-reliance involving market-like incentives in the redefinition of benefit regimes and governmentality associated with forms of ‘investment’ in at-risk children and families.

Neo-liberalism represents a continuing critique of state reason; its governance of welfare and education consists in some strategic innovations in reconceptualising the exercise of power, most notably the ideas of the responsibilisation of the self effected through a series of market-like arrangements. These new arrangements provide an increasingly accepted social recipe for individualising the social by substituting notions of civil society, social capital or community for state. At the same time, however, they carry the combined dangers, on the one hand, of pathologising and stigmatising those who are structurally excluded from the labour market, and on the other, of weighing down with debt - of prematurely mortgaging the future lives of - the next generation. The full social consequences of instituting a neo-liberal welfare system that individualises and privatises current welfare and education by deferring payment to the next generation via loans, user charges, forms of self-investment, and insurance schemes are yet to be investigated.

The theme of the ‘responsibilisation of the self’ both in the governance of education and welfare and especially as a means for encouraging an enterprise society has been prominent in Third Way politics, even though neo-liberal principles have been reworked within a different economic context. New Labour’s Third Way in an effort to hold on the so-called radical center places a great deal of emphasis on the economy and work as fundamental to the concept of citizenship. Indeed, through the concept of the ‘knowledge economy’ which served as the pivot for the Competitiveness Report, New Labour legitimises the concepts of lifelong learning and entrepreneurship aimed at the production of flexible workers and the combined notions of ‘education for work’ and ‘enterprise education’ (see Peters, 2001). There
is little doubt that New Labour remains committed to the principles of the neo-liberal global economy based on protecting multinationals and extending free trade. In domestic economic policy the Blair government seems intent on privatising public services such as railways and traffic control and introducing parallel forms of privatisation in health and education through the contracting out of services or the creation of quasi-markets. Bryan Turner (2001, p 194) in his discussion of the erosion of citizenship and especially the impact of forces of globalisation on the weakened nation-state, clearly indicates that high levels of economic participation mask a real change in the nature of the economy and obscures a transition from old to new welfare regimes. The new economic regime is based upon monetary stability, fiscal control and a relation in government regulation of the economy. In this new economic environment, one version of the Third-Way strategy involves, not protecting individuals from the uncertainties of the market that had dominated welfare strategies between 1930 and 1970, but helping people to participate successfully in the market through education (lifelong learning schemes), flexible employment (family-friendly employment strategies) and tax incentives.

It seems clear that New Labour in their second term of office will seek to extend the neo-liberal emphasis on enterprise culture in education as in other areas of society. Fairclough (2000, p 33) notes:

The equivalence between country, nation, and business goes with a positive construction of business. Some commentators suggest that New Labour is fascinated with the glamour of business. The ‘enterprise culture’ was a central theme of the Thatcher Government in the 1980s. It seems that New Labour is taking over Thatcherite discourse in this as in other respects. In his speech to the South African parliament in January 1999, Tony Blair said that ‘we need [a] culture of enterprise’, and the White paper on competition calls for an ‘enterprise culture’ and an ‘entrepreneurial culture’. The general idea that governments should seek social change through shifting ‘culture’ (implying an engineering of people’s culture from above) has been taken over from the Tories, as too has the glorification of ‘enterprise’... Tory initiatives to develop ‘entrepreneurial skills’ in school children are also being extended.

To understand this emphasis on ‘enterprise culture’ we must go back to study its development through the Thatcher years.

3. The Rise of Enterprise Culture and Enterprise Education

A notable feature of the early 1990s was the way in which the emphasis on the introduction of the new technologies has given way to a more general discourse that represents issues of economic and institutional reform in cultural terms (Keat and Abercrombie, 1991). In the case of Britain, questions of national economic survival and competition in the world economy came increasingly to be seen under the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major as questions of cultural reconstruction. According to Keat and Abercrombie, the idea of an enterprise culture ‘emerged as a central motif in the political thought and practice of the … government’ (1991, 1). The task of constructing such a culture has involved remodelling institutions along commercial lines and encouraging the acquisition and
use of enterprising qualities. Keat and Abercrombie see the ideological function of
the political rhetoric of enterprise as a particular interpretation for making sense of
the kind of economic and cultural changes that have been described under the
banners of postindustrialism, the information society, postmodernism, and
post-Fordism.

Morris (1991) traces the genesis and development of the concept of
enterprise from its beginnings in the thinking of the Centre for Policy Studies in the
link between Christianity and the ‘new Conservatism’ and in the work of Lord
Young. He distinguishes three phases, the latest of which he christens ‘partnership in
cultural engineering.’ This phase, which represents a massive cultural
reconstruction, has concerned policies involving ‘unprecedented government
intervention in education (at all levels)’ (Morris 1991, p 34-35).

By contrast Schwengel provides a snapshot of a more liberal German concept
than the British emphasis on enterprise. Kulturgesellschaft has a softer focus,
containing a utopian element that also attempts to provide ‘a framework for cultural
change beyond corporatist state regulation’ (1991, p 42). The emphasis on cultural
solutions to the problems of the 1990s is worth mentioning here. Kulturgesellschaft
is based on ‘promoting direct and early interaction between economy and culture’ (p
42). Unlike enterprise culture it relies on public sector leadership. Schwengel
comments:

Kulturgesellschaft seems to mark a middle way between the ‘soft’ debate on aesthetic
modernism and postmodernism, and the ‘hard’ debate on internationalist post-Fordist
competition in the world market, ecological crisis and the dramatic risks of a class war
between the north and the south (1991, p 139).

Hence, the emerging German solution also focuses on a cultural answer to
the issues of rapid technological change and the structural dominance of the service
sector. It is, however, less directly ideological and gives more space to the public
sector. In an illuminating passage, Schwengel writes:

We may have a post-Fordist theory of production, technology and consumption; we
may understand the change from organized capitalism to disorganized institutions of
regulation; we may understand the transformation of modernist texture into
post-modernist figuration. But we have no alternative, political symbolic center as a
necessary fiction. A new theory of modernization, which will be one of the most
decisive intellectual battlefields between the right and the left in the 1990s, has
explicitly to conceptualize the difference between social modernization and political
modernity. The discourses of enterprise culture and Kulturgesellschaft are already
providing arguments for both sides (1991, p 148).

These debates have also became important in New Zealand during the 1990s.
The Porter Project (Crocombe et al. 1991), for instance, focused very clearly on the
notion of enterprise culture and the way in which the remolding of the education
system is necessary to this end. The minister of education also picked up on this
theme, commenting on the way ‘imperatives of the modern world require a new
culture of enterprise and competition in our curriculum’ (Smith 1991, p 8). In the
New Zealand context this kind of rhetoric had, to a large extent, both grown out of
and been supplemented by a Treasury-driven emphasis on notions of consumer
sovereignty and contestability. The concept of consumer sovereignty provides a particular interpretation of the link between subjectivist theories of values and the market that does not respect the integrity of cultural practices in the public domain. Keat makes the following apposite remark:

The judgements made by democratic citizens are not regarded, at least in theory, as mere expression of personal preferences, but as resulting from a certain kind of critical engagement with the issues involved in the political sphere. But this is something that requires the acquisition and exercise of a number of skills and capacities, and hence also the availability of a wide range of cultural resources that provide, as it were, the necessary basis for relevant forms of ‘educative experience.’ There is thus a crucial role for certain cultural practices in contributing to this process, whose significance is itself at odds with any purely subjective theory of values (1991, p 228-29).

Clearly, education has emerged as one of the newest starships in the policy fleet of governments around the world. The choice of metaphor is not entirely frivolous. Education has come to symbolise an optimistic future based on the increasing importance of science and technology as the engine of economic growth and the means by which countries can successfully compete in the global economy in years to come. The metaphor also captures and updates the past popular discourse and iconography that surrounded an ideology which motivated US educational reformers in the 1960s during the Sputnik catch-up-with-the-Russians debate, the Star Wars scenario of the 1980s, and the more recent Japanese threat to American enterprise. In the era of the ‘new world order,’ of structural adjustment policies, of international and regional free trade agreements, the focus has shifted away from exploiting fears of imminent destruction in superpower rivalry to the role that education, in conjunction with the new information, computer and communicational technologies, can play in the game of increasing national competitive advantage. The emphasis on possible economic decline in face of international competition and the need to ‘catch up’ with other nations now occupies center ground.

Such a discourse, perhaps, is less naïve, optimistic, and forthright than it once was, given the uncertainty of the prospect for continuous economic growth, of its ecological sustainability, and of its democratic potential for redistributing wealth. Yet it is also both more strategic and effective. Alongside economic globalisation, there has been massive state asset sales programmes, wholesale restructuring of the core public sector, a creeping privatisation of health and commercialisation of education. In conjunction with these policies enacted during the 1980s there has been, more broadly considered, a deliberate and sustained attempt at cultural reconstruction. At the heart of this attempt is the notion of enterprise culture and the importance of reconstructing education so that it will deliver the necessary research, skills and attitudes required to compete in an increasingly competitive international economy.

The notion of enterprise culture, designed for a postindustrial, information economy of the 1990s, can be seen in poststructuralist terms as the creation of a new metanarrative, a totalizing and unifying story about the prospect of economic growth and development based on the triumvirate of science, technology, and education. This master narrative, which projects a national ideological vision, differs from the
social democratic narrative: It does not adopt the language of equality of opportunity and it does not attempt to redress power imbalances or socio-economic inequalities. The new neo-liberal metanarrative is based on a vision of the future: one sustained by ‘excellence,’ by ‘technological literacy,’ by ‘skills training,’ by ‘performance,’ and by ‘enterprise.’

The code words ‘enterprise’ and ‘enterprise culture’ are major signifiers in this new discourse, which emphasises that there has been too much emphasis on social and cultural objectives and insufficient emphasis on economic goals in our education system. Henceforth, we must invest heavily in education as a basis for future economic growth by redesigning the system so that it meets the needs of business and industry. The curriculum must also be redesigned to reflect the new realities and the need for the highly skilled flexible worker who possesses requisite skills in management, information handling, communication, problem solving, and decision making. As the metanarrative has grown it has also been transformed to encompass a new emphasis on regional educational standards, portability and transferability of qualifications, performance management of teachers, systems of national testing, and so on.

4. Governing the Entrepreneurial Self

Heap and Ross (1992, p 1) chart the shift in government thinking to move away from the dependency culture of the Nanny State to foster a new spirit of enterprise in the UK and ask,

Is it really possible for a government to achieve such a wholesale change in the values of a culture? Will the encouragement of individual initiative and the free play of market forces succeed without an accompanying change in the culture? And if the attempt were to succeed, what would be the costs? Can the public virtues of caring for those unable to care for themselves, survive in this new order?

They seek to answer these questions on the basis of the work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas who understands individuals not as the instrumental rational agents of neoclassical economic theory, but rather as beings who need to ‘make sense’ of their world and their place in it. This conception of human beings, by contrast, does not elevate rational choice (considered as the most efficient means to serve a given end) as the paradigm of all human activity but rather emphasises that individuals as consumers also act expressively. In other words, the valuing of goods is a collective process involving a whole network of judgements and consumption is an active process that takes place against a background of shared categories, beliefs and values constituting a culture.

Mary Douglas (1992) begins her discussion of the person in enterprise culture by stating that enterprise culture is ‘justified by the claim that it frees persons [driven by self-interested motives] from constraints’ imposed by bureaucratic regulation which ‘inhibit the pursuit of freely-chosen objectives, and so infringes the essential liberties of the person’ (p. 41). For Douglas, the self and the concept of person is locked into ideology, and the ‘recognising the ideological structure of the self is the right starting-point for an investigation’. She indicates the way in which
the self and the person have become separated in Western discourse over the last three hundred years, where the private self is bracketed from inquiry so as to protect the freedom of persons from ideological coercion and the category of the person ‘has been filled by the need to meet the forensic requirement of a law-abiding society and an effective, rational judicial system’ (p. 43). In terms of Douglas’ distinction, claims to citizenship have traditionally been based upon the category of the person so that, for instance, (under Marshall’s analysis) the civil aspect refers to the achievement of individual freedoms, right to property and to justice, the political aspect refers to participation in political power (free elections and the like), and the social aspect refers to a basis for economic welfare and security. The category of the self, by contrast, has been emptied of content, left ineffable, and from the time of Locke, seen to be beyond knowledge. Enterprise culture and enterprise education seem like part of an attempt to blend the public concept of person (and citizen) with a form of individual and entrepreneurial self that is allegedly written into the self.2

Nikolas Rose (1998, p 151) analyses the forms of political reason that attempted to create an enterprise culture by according a certain political value to the self as an ‘enterprising self’. As he rightly predicted, while the salvationist rhetoric of the Conservative discourse of enterprise culture might fade away, the presupposition of the autonomous, choosing, free self as the value, ideal, and objective underpinning and legitimating political activity imbues the political mentalities of the modern West.

The notion of the ‘enterprising self’ or ‘entrepreneurial self’ as I have it in the title of this paper was not an ‘idiosyncratic obsession of the right’ but rather chimed and resonated with ‘basic presuppositions that … are embodied in the very language that we use to make persons thinkable’.3

He refers to Foucault’s work as productive for ‘linking practices bearing on the self to forms of power’ where power is not considered repressive, dominating and negating the capacity of individuals, but ‘as the creation, shaping, and utilization of human beings as subjects’ (p 151) such that power works through subjectivity. Rose concludes that, therefore, to investigate the relations between the self and power from this perspectives is to document and analyse the ways in which human beings have been created as subjects through various governmental strategies and forms of regulation.

Thus, a Foucauldian approach to the question of governance avoids interpreting liberalism as an ideology, political philosophy, or an economic theory and reconfigures it as a form of governmentality with an emphasis on the question of how power is exercised.4 It makes central the notion of the self-limiting state which, in contrast to the administrative (or ‘police’) state, brings together in productive ways questions of ethics and technique, through the responsibilization of moral agents and the active reconstruction of the relation between government and self-government. On this view neoliberalism is seen as an intensification of an economy of moral regulation first developed by liberals, and not merely or primarily as a political reaction to big government or the so-called bureaucratic welfare state of the postwar Keynesian settlement. A Foucauldian approach understands neoliberalism
in terms of its replacement of the natural and spontaneous order characteristic of Hayekian liberalism with ‘artificially arranged or contrived forms of the free, entrepreneurial, and competitive conduct of economic-rational individuals’ (Burchell 1996, p 23). And, further, it understands neoliberalism through the development of ‘a new relation between expertise and politics,’ especially in the realm of welfare, where an actuarial rationality and new forms of prudentialism manifest and constitute themselves discursively in the language of ‘purchaser-provider,’ audit, performance, and ‘risk management’. Let me end by picking out several interrelated features of neoliberalism that promote ‘enterprise culture’ and the concept of the ‘entrepreneurial self’.

First, an emphasis on ‘natural’ versus ‘contrived’ forms of the market. Hayek’s notion of natural laws based on spontaneously ordered institutions in the physical (crystals, galaxies) and social (morality, language, market) worlds has been replaced with an emphasis on the market as an artefact or culturally derived form and (growing out of the callaxy approach) a constitutional perspective that focuses on the judicio-legal rules governing the framework within the game of enterprise is played.

Second, the politics-as-exchange innovation of Public Choice theory extends Hayek’s spontaneous order conception (callactics) of the institution of the market beyond simple exchange to complex exchange and finally to all processes of voluntary agreement among persons. This has been described as the ‘economic imperialism’ of the Chicago school, i.e., where economic models are imported to explain non-market behaviour. It is, perhaps, most well known in educational circles in Gary Becker’s statement concerning human capital theory.

Third, and, perhaps, most importantly, the promotion of a close relation between government and self-government. In Foucault’s terms this means that liberalism is to be understood as a doctrine which positively requires that individuals be free in order to govern. Government is conceived as the community of free, autonomous, self-regulating individuals with an emphasis on the ‘responsibilisation’ of individuals as moral agents. This feature also involves the neoliberal revival of homo economicus, based on assumptions of individuality, rationality and self-interest, as an all-embracing redescription of the social as a form of the economic and thus, is strongly related to the second feature mentioned above.

Fourth, the development of a new relation between government and management. In particular, this feature refers to the rise of the new managerialism and so-called ‘New Public Management’ which implies a shift from policy and administration to management. It also involves the emulation of private sector management styles, an emphasis on ‘freedom to manage’ and the promotion of ‘self-managing’ (i.e., quasi-autonomous) individuals and institutions, giving rise to the privatisation and individualisation of ‘risk management’ and the development of new forms of prudentialism. In education, we see this development echoed in a range of applications: the doctrine of the self-managing school, a substitution of educational management for professional leadership, the emphasis of management theory and techniques applied to the classroom and to children’s behaviour.
Fifth, a degovernmentalisation of the State considered as a positive technique of government. This means government ‘through’ and by the market, including promotion of consumer-driven forms of social provision in health, education, and welfare, ‘contracting out’ of public provision (as announced by New Labour in their second term of office in health), the development of quasi-markets and parallel forms of privatisation.

Finally, and briefly, the promotion of a new relationship between government and knowledge. This has been referred to as ‘government at a distance’ which is developed through relations of new forms of expertise (expert systems) and politics, especially the development of new forms of social accounting embodying an actuarial rationality.

These characteristics of neo-liberalism also underlie Third Way politics. They come together in the concepts of ‘enterprise culture’ and ‘enterprise education’ – concepts that Gordon Brown and Tony Blair are keen to promote.

References


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Endnotes

1. This paper draws upon some material from my 'Neo-liberalism, the Enterprise Curriculum, and the Constitution of Self in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Chapter 1) in De Alba et al (2000). See also Peters, 2001; 1997. A version of this paper was presented at The 4th International Conference for Children's Social and Economics, Education Entrepreneurship and Citizenship in the 21st Century, Durham University 9-11 July, 2001.

2. Douglas uses Dennet’s notion of the self as an intentional system but suggests that it must be linked with the larger intentional system which is community. As she writes: The community is the locus of ideology connecting the idea of person to the culture which its members are making (p. 60). See also Hollis (1992) use of Wittgensteinian arguments to bolster Douglas position. He argues enterprise culture sets about sacralising the social bond by putting standard theory of rational behaviour into the heads of citizens, who then unsurprisingly cease to believe in the sacredness of social responsibilities (p. 79). On Theorizing Citizenship Education see the special issue of The School Field, X, 3&4, Autumn/Winter 1999. See also Paterson (2000).

3. See also Rose (1993; 1996).